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ALEXANDER B. CVITAN (CSB 81746) and J. DAVID SACKMAN (CSB 106703), and STEVEN T. NUTTER (CSB 67008), Members of REICH, ADELL & CVITAN A Professional Law Corporation

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Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

SOHIL KARIMY,

Plaintiff,

VS.

ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA – SAN DIEGO CHAPTER, INC., APPRENTICESHIP & TRAINING TRUST FUND,

Defendants.

'08 CV 0297

HYPY:

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, TITLE VII, THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AND RELATED STATE CLAIMS [42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2002e-2, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)]

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

[JURISDICTION AND VENUE]

This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over this action 1. pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2002e-5(f), for the claims of employment discrimination, and under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) for the failure to pay overtime. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) as arising from the same core facts, namely for the same acts of discharging plaintiff and failing to pay overtime. Venue is proper in district, as the

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defendant has its principal place of business in this district, and the contract of employment was entered into and terminated in this district.

[PARTIES]

- 2. Plaintiff Sohil Karimy (Karimy) is an individual residing within this district.
- 3. Defendant Associated General Contractors of America San Diego Chapter, Inc., Apprenticeship & Training Trust Fund (Training Trust), is an express trust and an employee welfare plan, as defined in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 2(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(1). The Training Trust has its principal place of business in San Diego County, and provides apprenticeship and training programs in San Diego, Imperial, Orange and Riverside Counties, California.
- 4. The "plan sponsor" of the Training Trust is the Associated General Contractors of America San Diego Chapter, Inc. (AGC), which is an association of employers in the construction industry. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the AGC is incorporated in California as a non-profit corporation.

[FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS]
APPRENTICESHIP PROGRAMS PROVIDED BY THE TRAINING TRUST

5. The Training Trust is an express trust governed by a Board of Trustees, for the purpose of providing apprenticeship and training programs in the construction industry. It currently offers apprentice programs in the following construction crafts: Carpenter, Cement Mason, Drywall Finisher, Drywall Lather, Heavy Equipment

Operator, Laborer, and Painter. To conduct these apprentice program, the Training Trust has employed in excess of 20 persons at all relevant times, within the State of California, to provide training, coordination, administrative and clerical functions.

- 6. The Training Trust is sponsored by the AGC, from whose membership the Trustees of the Training Trust are chosen. Members of the AGC (and other employers in the construction industry) may send their employees for training, or request to employ registered apprentices, under the apprenticeship programs of the Training Trust, and thereby obtain the advantages of the employment of these apprentices on public works, as described below.
- 7. The Training Trust has been approved as a recognized apprenticeship program by the Division of Apprenticeship Standards of the Department of Industrial Relations of the State of California (DIR), pursuant to California Labor Code § 3075. The Training Trust has also been approved as a recognized apprenticeship program by the Office of Apprenticeship Training, Employment and Labor Services of the Department of Labor of the United States of America (DOL), pursuant to the National Apprenticeship Act of 1937 (Fitzgerald Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 50, et. seq., and implementing regulations, 29 C.F.R. Part 29.
- 8. As a result of the DIR certification as an apprenticeship program by the DIR, employers who contribute to the Training Trust may employ apprentices enrolled in the apprenticeship program, and pay significantly lower wage rates on public works contracted by a public agency in California. Similarly, certification as an apprenticeship program by the DOL allows employers who contribute to the Training Trust to employ apprentices enrolled in the apprenticeship program, and pay significantly lower wage rates on public works contracted by an agency of the United States of America.

Document 1

- 9. Apprentices enrolled in the apprenticeship programs of the Training Trust are required by both federal and state regulation to enter into a written apprenticeship agreement, which is referred to as being "indentured." The apprentices are required to complete a certain amount of on-the-job training with their employer, and to complete a certain number of hours of classroom training in specified subjects, provided by the Training Trust. These minimum standards for apprentices in each craft must be specified in the forms submitted by the Training Trust to the DIR and DOL for approval of each of their apprenticeship programs, and the Training Trust's ability to provide such training is an essential element for approval by both the DIR and DOL.
- 10. The Training Trust receives contributions from employers participating in the Trust, including AGC members. These contributions are allowed to be credited toward the obligation of these employers to pay prevailing wages on public works (both federal and state), in lieu of cash wages.
- 11. The Training Trust also receives "Montoya Funds" from the State of California for classroom training. The Training Trust submits a form listing the hours of classroom training actually provided to each apprentice by the instructors employed by the Training Trust, to a "Local Education Agency" (LEA) as defined in California Labor Code § 3074. The LEA then submits those forms to the State of California. Pursuant to California Education Code § 8152(e), the State of California may only reimburse the LEA for hours of instruction actually provided to indentured apprentices under an approved apprenticeship program, at a specified hourly rate per apprentice. The LEA deducts an administrative fee from these funds, and sends the balance to the Training Trust.
 - 12. The Training Trust is required to report the names of its registered

apprentices to the DIR and DOL. The Training Trust is also obligated to report to the DIR and the DOL when an apprentice either is terminated from the apprenticeship program, or graduates. Under both federal and state regulation, an indentured apprentice may only graduate from the apprenticeship program, to become a journeyman in that craft, upon satisfactory completion of on-the-job and classroom training, as specified in the written apprenticeship program standards which the Training Trust has submitted to the DIR and DOL.

EMPLOYMENT OF KARIMY

- 13. Plaintiff was employed by the Training Trust as a Coordinator from August 2003 through April 2006, and as a Director of Operations and Education from April 2006 until his involuntary termination in September 2007. Throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff performed his job in a capable and competent manner and was regularly awarded merit salary increases, bonuses, and positive evaluations. On September 17, 2007 Plaintiff's contract of employment was involuntarily terminated by the Training Trust.
- 14. As "Coordinator," some of Karimy's duties involved recruiting contractors, recruiting apprentices, and informing apprentices and contractors of the applicable laws. He was listed by the Training Trust as a "non-exempt" employee, and paid a salary in the range of \$55,000.00 to \$65,000.00 per year.
- 15. As "Director of Operations and Education," some of Karimy's duties involved preparing apprenticeship class schedules, attending meetings, recruiting contractors, working with apprentices, and performing several human resources functions.

- 16. Plaintiff's salary, at the time of his termination, was \$80,000.00 per year. He was also entitled to benefits as part of his compensation.
- 17. Defendant fraudulently submitted false claims to state agencies to receive state funds. Specifically, Defendant knowingly submitted claims indicating that apprentices were receiving more hours of education than apprentices were in fact receiving in order to receive additional Montoya funds from the State.
- 18. Defendant also fraudulently gave apprentices credit towards graduation for classes they never took, or skills they did not have. In some cases, apprentices were given credit for classes which the Training Trust did not even provide. These fraudulent credits were given at the request of AGC members, including trustees of the Training Trust, and not for any legitimate reason.
- 19. Defendant also fraudulently back-dated the registration of some apprentices, to a date before they were actually indentured. This was done at the request of AGC members, so those AGC members could pay those employees at the lower apprentice rate, even though they were not really indentured as apprentices at that time.
- 20. During his employment, Plaintiff made several complaints regarding the submission of fraudulent claims to the state, fraudulent credits given, and fraudulent back-dating of the registration of apprentices. Plaintiff was ordered to assist in these fraudulent activities, despite his protests. As a direct result of his complaints, Plaintiff was retaliated against in the form of a substantial increase in work-load, a negative evaluation, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
 - 21. In response to Plaintiff's complaints regarding Defendant's fraudulent

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practices, Plaintiff was told by the Executive Director of the Training Trust that if Plaintiff did not like the way things were done, Plaintiff should leave.

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- 22. Also in response to several of Plaintiff's complaints regarding Defendant's fraudulent practices, the Trust Chairman, Tom Brown, reprimanded Plaintiff and told him that Plaintiff's "brown eyes, brown hair, and middle eastern culture may not work in sunny southern California with blue eyes, blond haired people, and maybe you [Karimy] might need to leave." This was only one of several similar remarks made by his superiors regarding Karimy's ethnic background.
- In July 2007, Plaintiff met with Defendants' Trust Chairman and 23. Executive Director, expressed his concerns regarding Defendant's fraudulent activities, and requested to meet with the Trustees. As a result, in August, 2007, Plaintiff was given a substantially heightened workload, to be completed within one week. As a direct result of Plaintiff's complaints, Defendant gave Plaintiff the only negative work evaluation given to Plaintiff throughout his employment with Defendant. Plaintiff was the only employee evaluated at this time.
- In September 2007, Plaintiff again requested to meet with the Trustees 24. on September 17, 2007 to discuss Defendant's submission of false claims and other inappropriate conduct described above. His request was denied.
- 25. Plaintiff's employment was terminated by the Training Trust on September 17, 2007.

-7-

[FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF] [VIOLATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT] [42 U.S.C. § 1981]

- 26. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior allegations.
- 27. Plaintiff's contract of employment with the Training Trust was a "contract" protected by the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
- 28. Plaintiff is of Persian ancestry, with distinctive Middle-Eastern features, and a noticeable accent. He was perceived by his supervisors at the Training Trust as other than a "white citizen." This was made clear by the statement of Tom Brown, Chairman of the Training Trust, that Karimy's "brown eyes, brown hair, and middle eastern culture may not work in sunny southern California with blue eyes, blond haired people, and maybe you [Karimy] might need to leave."
- 29. The Training Trust had no legal reason to terminate Karimy's employment contract.
- 30. The Training Trust terminated Karimy's employment contract without legal justification, because (at least in part) that he was perceived as not a "white citizen." By so doing it violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
- 31. As a result of defendant's violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, plaintiff has been deprived of the benefits of his employment contract, and has suffered humiliation and emotional distress.
 - 32. Defendant's violation of the Civil Rights Act was intentional and meant

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to cause harm to plaintiff. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover punitive damages for this violation.

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Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), plaintiff is also entitled to recover his 33. attorney fees and costs from defendant.

[SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF] [INTENTIONAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION]

[42 U.S.C. §§ 2002e-2 and 2002e-5(f)]

- Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior allegations. 34.
- 35. Plaintiff is of Persian ethnicity, which was perceived by his supervisors at the Training Trust as other than a "white citizen." This was made clear by the statement of Tom Brown, Chairman of the Training Trust, that Karimy's "brown eyes, brown hair, and middle eastern culture may not work in sunny southern California with blue eyes, blond haired people, and maybe you [Karimy] might need to leave."
- The Training Trust had no legal reason to terminate Karimy's 36. employment contract.
- The Training Trust discharged Karimy from his employment, without 37. legal justification, because (at least in part) of his ethnicity, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2002e-2(a)(1).
- As a result of his illegal discharge, Karimy has suffered lost wages and 38. 28 | benefits, future earnings, humiliation and emotional distress.

weekly overtime, under any provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29

Plaintiff's employment was not exempt from the requirement to pay

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45.

U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219, and implementing regulations.	In fact, Defendant recognized
Plaintiff's non-exempt status as a Coordinator in writing	ng.

- 46. Throughout his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff frequently worked more than forty hours per week with the knowledge, consent and acquiescence of the Defendants' supervisors, performing tasks which have been assigned to him.
- 47. Plaintiff was not generally paid at the rate of time-and-one-half his regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty per week. Plaintiff requested overtime pay on numerous occasions. On at least one occasion he was paid overtime as requested. However, on no other occasion was he paid overtime for time worked over forty in a week.
- 48. Defendant's failure to pay overtime to Plaintiff, and other employees of Defendant, is in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a) and 215(a)(2).
- 49. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the Plaintiff is entitled to recover his unpaid overtime wages, and an equal amount of liquidated damages.
- 50. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiff is entitled to recover a reasonable amount of attorney fees, and costs incurred in this action.

[FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF] [CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT & HOUSING ACT] [CA Government Code §§ 12940 and 12965]

51. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior allegations.

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- 52. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over this claim, as arising under the same facts as the First and Second Claims for Relief.
- Plaintiff is of Persian ancestry, which was perceived by his supervisors 53. at the Training Trust as other than a "white citizen." This was made clear by the statement of Tom Brown, Chairman of the Training Trust, that Karimy's "brown eyes, brown hair, and middle eastern culture may not work in sunny southern California with blue eyes, blond haired people, and maybe you [Karimy] might need to leave."
- The Training Trust had no legal reason to terminate Karimy's 54. employment contract.
- 55. The Training Trust discharged Karimy from his employment, without legal justification, because (at least in part) of his ancestry, in violation of California Government Code § 12940(a).
- As a result of his illegal discharge, Karimy has suffered lost wages and 56. benefits, future earnings, humiliation and emotional distress.
- 57. Defendant's violation of California Government Code § 12940(a) was intentional and meant to cause harm to plaintiff. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover punitive damages for this violation.
- 58. Pursuant to California Government Code § 12965(b), plaintiff is also entitled to recover his attorney fees and costs from defendant.
 - On or about January 16, 2008, Karimy filed a charge with the U.S. 59.

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Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which was given charge number 1 488-2008-00198. The charge was concurrently filed with the California Fair 2 Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC). 3 4 On February 1, 2008, at his request, the EEOC issued a "Notice of Right 60. 5 To Sue" as to his charge. A copy of that Notice of Right to Sue is attached here as 6 7 Exhibit 1. 8 On February 1, 2008, at his request, the FEHC issued a "Notice of Right 9 61. to Sue" as to his charge. A copy of that Notice of Right to Sue is attached here as 10 Exhibit 2. 11 12 [FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF] 13 [CALIFORNIA OVERTIME LAWS] 14 [CA LABOR CODE § 510; IWC Order No. 4-2001] 15 16 Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior allegations. 62. 17 18 This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over this claim, as arising 19 63. under the same facts as the Third Claim for Relief. 20 21 22

During times relevant to this action, California law, as set forth in 64. California Labor Code § 510 and the Wage Orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission, including Wage Order No. 4-2001, and elsewhere, provides that if an employee works more than 40 hours per week, or more than 8 hours per day, that employee is entitled to overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half of his or her ordinary hourly rate for each overtime hour worked, and in some 28 circumstances twice his or her ordinary rate.

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(65.	Plaintiff's employment was not exempt from the requirement to pay
overtir	ne, un	der any provision of California law and implementing regulations. In
fact, D	efend	ant recognized Plaintiff's non-exempt status as a Coordinator in writing

- Throughout his employment, Plaintiff frequently worked more than per day and more than forty hours per week with the knowledge, consent cence of the Defendants' supervisors, performing tasks which have been him.
- Plaintiff was not generally paid at the rate of time-and-one-half his of pay for all hours worked in excess of eight hours per day or forty per intiff requested overtime pay on numerous occasions. On at least one was paid overtime as requested. However, on no other occasion was he ne for time worked over eight in a day.
- Pursuant to California Labor Code § 1194, Plaintiff is entitled to the he full amount of overtime wages owed them, calculated at the proper er with interest from the date those wages were due.
- Pursuant to California Labor Code § 1194(a), Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs.

[SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF] [FAILURE TO PAY WAGES UPON TERMINATION] [CA Labor Code § 203]

70. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations.

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This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over this claim, as arising

under the same facts as the Third Claim for Relief.

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72. California Labor Code section 203 requires every employer to pay an employee whose employment has ceased all wages owed to the employee at stated periods of time, in no event later than 72 hours after the employment has ended.

Document 1

Plaintiff was not paid all of the wages due him upon termination, as 73. described in the previous allegations. In addition, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff all of his accrued vacation pay upon termination. These wages still have not been paid prior to the filing of this action. Defendant's failure to pay said wages on time or at all was willful within the meaning of Labor Code section 203.

Plaintiff is entitled to one day's wages for each day he was not timely 74. paid all wages due on and after the end of his employment, up to a maximum of 30 days' wages, plus all accrued vacation still unpaid.

[SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF] [WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY]

- Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior allegations. 75.
- This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over this claim, as arising 76. under the same facts as the First and Second Claims for Relief. This Claim is plead in the alternative to the First, Second and Fourth Claims. Plaintiff is unsure whether the real reason for his termination was primarily his race or primarily his complaints about illegal acts of defendant, but Plaintiff is sure that the real reason is one or both of those, and that there was no legitimate, legal, reason for his termination.

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- 77. Pursuant to California Education Code § 8152(e), the State of California may only reimburse the Training Trust (through an LEA) for hours of instruction actually provided to indentured apprentices under an approved apprenticeship program, at a specified hourly rate per apprentice. Pursuant to Government Code §§ 12650 and 12651, it is illegal to submit false claims to the State of California. Pursuant to California Labor Code § 3075 and implementing regulations, and the Fitzgerald Act and implementing regulations, Defendant was obligated to provide the training for skills as stated in its application for approval to the DIR and DOL, respectively.
- Contrary to the law and public policy of California, Defendant routinely 78. submitted false statements to the State of California, claiming that apprentices had been given hours of instruction which they did not in fact receive. Defendant knew this information was false, and specifically instructed and required Plaintiff to put this false information on the statements.
- 79. Defendant also fraudulently gave apprentices credit towards graduation for classes they never took, or skills they did not have. In some cases, apprentices were given credit for classes which the Training Trust did not even provide. These fraudulent credits were given at the request of AGC members, including trustees of the Training Trust, and not for any legitimate reason. This was contrary to the law and the representations made by Defendant in its applications for approval to the DIR and DOL.
- 80. Defendant also fraudulently back-dated the registration of some apprentices, to a date before they were actually indentured. This was done at the request of AGC members, so those AGC members could pay those employees at the lower apprentice rate, even though they were not really indentured as apprentices at

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that time. This was contrary to the law and the representations made by Defendant in its applications for approval to the DIR and DOL.

- 81. Between November 2006 and September 2007, Plaintiff made several complaints regarding the submission of fraudulent claims to the state, fraudulent credits given, and fraudulent back-dating of the registration of apprentices. Plaintiff was ordered to assist in these fraudulent activities, despite his protests. As a direct result of his complaints, Plaintiff was retaliated against in the form of a substantial increase in work-load, a negative evaluation, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
 - In response to one of Plaintiff's complaints regarding Defendant's 82. fraudulent activities, Plaintiff was told by the Executive Director that if Plaintiff did not like the way things were done, Plaintiff should leave.
 - In July 2007, Plaintiff met with Defendants' Trust Chairman and 83. Executive Director, expressed his concerns regarding Defendant's fraudulent activities, and requested to meet with the Trustees. As a result, in August, 2007, Plaintiff was given a substantially heightened workload, to be completed within one week. As a direct result of Plaintiff's complaints, Defendant gave Plaintiff the only negative work evaluation given to Plaintiff throughout his employment with Defendant. Plaintiff was the only employee evaluated at this time.
 - 84. In September 2007, Plaintiff again requested to meet with the Trustees on September 17, 2007 to discuss Defendant's submission of false claims and other inappropriate conduct described above. His request was denied.
 - On September 17, 2007, Plaintiff was terminated by Defendant from 85.

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his employment. The true reason for his termination was because he complained of about Defendants' fraudulent activity, as set forth above.

- 86. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' willful, knowing, intentional and wrongful termination of his employment, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer substantial losses in earnings and other employment benefits.
- As a proximate result of defendants' willful, knowing, and intentional 87. discrimination against Plaintiff, he has suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, emotional distress, and mental and physical pain and anguish, all to his damage in a sum according to proof.
- Defendants took such discriminatory action with the intent to vex, injure 88. and annoy Plaintiff, to impose an unjust hardship upon him for asserting rights under the law, in blatant, wanton, conscious, and callous disregard of his rights, and to create a climate of fear to deter its other employees from asserting rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages, according to proof at trial.
- In addition, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of fees and costs for his 89. claim of wrongful termination.

[EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF] [UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES] [CA BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200 et seq.]

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior allegations. 90.

91. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over this claim, as arising under the same facts as the Third Claim for Relief.

- 92. This claim is brought by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the general public, pursuant to Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et. seq. The failures to pay overtime, and the other conduct of the Defendants above constitute unlawful, unfair and fraudulent business acts and practices, and unfair competition, within the meaning of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. Plaintiff is a "person" within the meaning of Business and Professions Code § 17204, with standing to bring this suit for injunctive relief and restitution, to remedy the harm to him and to vindicate the public interest.
- 93. Defendant has acted contrary to these public policies and has thus engaged in unlawful and unfair business practices in violation of the Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq, depriving Plaintiff of rights, benefits, and privileges guaranteed to all employees under law. As a result, Defendant has been unjustly enriched.
- 94. Business and Professions Code § 17203 provides that the Court may restore an aggrieved party any money or property acquired by means of unlawful and unfair business practices. Plaintiff seeks restitution of all unpaid wages, according to proof.
- 95. Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney fees and costs for bringing this claim, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 1 2 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment against Defendant, as follows: 3 4 I. ON THE FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 5 6 7 A. Back pay, at his last rate of pay, from the date of his termination until judgment, together with interest; 8 9 B. Restoration or payment of all benefits to which Plaintiff would have been 10 entitled at the time of his termination, from the date of his termination until judgment, together with interest; 12 13 C. Front pay of wages and benefits to which Plaintiff would have been 14 entitled, calculated from the date of Judgment to the date upon which Plaintiff could reasonably be expected to obtain equivalent employment; 16 17 D. Damages for emotional distress caused by Plaintiff's illegal termination, 18 according to proof; 19 20 E. Punitive damages, according to proof; 21 22 F. For attorney fees and costs of suit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); and 23 24 G. Such other relief which the Court may deem just. 25 26

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N THE SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

A. Back pay, at his last rate of pay, from the date of his termination until nent, together with interest;

- B. Restoration or payment of all benefits to which Plaintiff would have been ed at the time of his termination, from the date of his termination until nent, together with interest;
- C. Front pay of wages and benefits to which Plaintiff would have been ed, calculated from the date of Judgment to the date upon which Plaintiff could nably be expected to obtain equivalent employment;
- D. Damages for emotional distress caused by Plaintiff's illegal termination, ding to proof;
 - E. Punitive damages, according to proof;
 - F. For attorney fees and costs of suit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2002e-5(k); and
 - G. Such other relief which the Court may deem just.

III. ON THE THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

A. For unpaid weekly overtime, at one-and-one-half times his regular rate of pay, for all work from three years prior to the filing of this action, according to proof;

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1	B. For an equal amount of liquidated damages, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
2	216(b);
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4	C. For attorney fees and costs, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); and
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6	D. For such further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
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8	IV. ON THE FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
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0	A. Back pay, at his last rate of pay, from the date of his termination until
1	judgment, together with interest;
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3	B. Restoration or payment of all benefits to which Plaintiff would have been
4	entitled at the time of his termination, from the date of his termination until
5	judgment, together with interest;
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17	C. Front pay of wages and benefits to which Plaintiff would have been
8	entitled, calculated from the date of Judgment to the date upon which Plaintiff could
9	reasonably be expected to obtain equivalent employment;
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21	D. Damages for emotional distress caused by Plaintiff's illegal termination,
22	according to proof;
23	E. Punitive damages, according to proof;
24 25	E. Fullitive damages, according to proof,
26	F. For attorney fees and costs of suit, pursuant to California Government
27	Code § 12965(b); and
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1	G. Such other relief which the Court may deem just.
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3	V. ON THE FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
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5	A. All unpaid hours worked, and the balance of the full amount of overtime
6	wages owed, pursuant to California Labor Code § 1194;
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8	B. Interest on the overtime wages, from the dates they were due;
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10	C. Reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to California Labor Code §
11	1194(a); and
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13	D. Such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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15	VI. ON THE SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
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17	A. Judgment for one day's wages for each day from termination to payment,
18	up to a maximum of 30 days' wages, at his last rate of pay;
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20	B. Attorney fees and costs; and
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22	C. Such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
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24	VII. ON THE SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
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26	A. Back pay, at his last rate of pay, from the date of his termination until
27	judgment, together with interest;
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1	B. Restoration or payment of all benefits to which Plaintiff would have been
2	entitled at the time of his termination, from the date of his termination until
3	judgment, together with interest;
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5	C. Front pay of wages and benefits to which Plaintiff would have been
6	entitled, calculated from the date of Judgment to the date upon which Plaintiff could
7	reasonably be expected to obtain equivalent employment;
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9	D. Damages for humiliation and emotional distress caused by Plaintiff's
10	illegal termination, according to proof;
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12	E. Punitive damages, according to proof;
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14	F. For attorney fees and costs of suit; and
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16	G. Such other relief which the Court may deem just.
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18	VIII. ON THE EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
19	
20	A. For an Accounting and Restitution of the difference between the wages
21	actually paid Plaintiff, and the wages required by law to be paid within four years of
22	filing this complaint;
23	D. D. C. Land Comm
24	B. For a preliminary and a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant from
25	failing to pay overtime to Coordinators, and for threatening or punishing in any way,
26	employees who complain or testify about Defendant's illegal practices; and
27	
28	///

C. For attorney fees and costs of suit, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5; and D. Such further relief as this Court may deem just and proper. Respectfully Submitted, . Dated: February 12, 2008 NUTTER, Members of REICH, ADELL & CVITAN A Professional Law Corporation By:

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff demands trial by jury to the fullest extent permitted in this action, including any claims by Defendants in this action.

Dated: February 2008 ALEXANDER B. C

STEVEN T. NUTTER, Members of

A Professional Law Corporation

DAYAD SACKMAN

155052.2 -26-

Case 3:08-cv-00297 CAB Document 1

Los Angeles, CA 90010

Filed 02/14/2008

Page 28 of 33

EEOC Form 161-B (3/98)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUE (ISSUED ON REQUEST)

	Karlmy VIa Suena Center, CA 92082		401 B S Suite 5	
	On behalf of person(s) aggrieved whos CONFIDENTIAL (29 CFR §1601.7(a))			
EEOC Charge	No.	EEOC Representative		Télephone No.
488-2008-0	0198	Carmen Ortiz, investigator		(619) 557-7288
		(Se	e also the addit	ional information enclosed with this form.)
Title VII of the	Il and/or the ADA based on the about the filed in a federal or state of lost. (The time limit for filing suit be	ove-numbered charge. It has be ourt <u>WITHIN 90 DAYS</u> of your based on a state claim may be d	en issued at your receipt of this	This is your Notice of Right to Sue, issued ur request. Your lawsuit under Title VII or notice; or your right to sue based on this
	More than 180 days have passed			
X	Less than 180 days have passed be able to complete its administra	since the filing of this charge, b tive processing within 180 days	ut I have determined the filling of	nined that it is unlikely that the EEOC will this charge.
X	The EEOC is terminating its proce	essing of this charge.		,
	The EEOC will continue to proces	s this charge.		
Age Discrim 90 days after your case:	r you receive notice that we have o	Therefore, your lowest under the	ANFA must i	om 60 days after the charge was filed until the paragraph marked below applies to be filed in federal or state court <u>WITHIN</u> the above-numbered charge will be lost.
	The EEOC is continuing its hand you may file suit in federal or stat	ling of your ADEA case. Howe e court under the ADEA at this ti	ver, if 60 days h	nave passed since the filing of the charge,
in federal or any violatio	state court within 2 years (3 years ns that occurred more than 2 years)	ars (3 years) before you file su	t may not be c	is not required.) EPA suits must be brought yment. This means that backpay due for ollectible.
If you file sui	t, based on this charge, please send	a copy of your court complaint to	this office.	
-		On behalf of	he Commission	1
		Caul &	esen .	2/1/2008
Enclosures	(s)	Raul G. Gre Acting Dire		' (Date Mailed)
	Pete Saucedo Human Resources Director ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTR P.O. Box 927870	ACTORS OF AMERICA		
	San Diego, CA 92192			·
	Natalia Bautista, Esq. REICH, ADELL & CVITAN 3550 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 2000		3	·

STATE OF CALIFORNIA - STATE AND CONSUMER SERVICES AGENCY

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor

DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT & HOUSING

1350 Front Street, Suite 3005 San Diego, CA 92101 (619) 645-2681 TTY (800) 700-2320 Fax (619) 645-2683 www.dfeh.ca.gov



February 4, 2008

SOPHIL KARIMY 13099 Via Suena Valley Center, CA 92082

RE:

E200708D1003-00-c

KARIMY/ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA

Dear SOPHIL KARIMY:

NOTICE OF CASE CLOSURE

This letter informs that the above-referenced complaint that was filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) has been closed effective January 18, 2008 because an immediate right-to-sue notice was requested. DFEH will take no further action on the complaint.

This letter is also the Right-To-Sue Notice. According to Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), a civil action may be brought under the provisions of the Fair Employment and Housing Act against the person, employer, labor organization or employment agency named in the above-referenced complaint. The civil action must be filed within one year from the date of this letter.

If a federal notice of Right-To-Sue is wanted, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) must be visited to file a complaint within 30 days of receipt of this DFEH *Notice of Case Closure* or within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act, whichever is earlier.

Notice of Case Closure Page Two

DFEH does not retain case files beyond three years after a complaint is filed, unless the case is still open at the end of the three-year period.

Sincerely,

Belinda LeDoux District Administrator

Belinda Le Doux

cc: Case File

Director Human Resources/Personnel ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA P.O. Box 927870 San Diego, CA 92192-7870

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHÊRN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO DIVISION

147668 * * C O P Y * * February 14, 2008 15:29:57

Civ Fil Non-Pris

USAO #.: 08CV0297 CIVIL FILING

Judge..: M. JAMES LORENZ

Amount.:

\$350.00 CK

Check#.: BC# 1331

\$350.00

FROM: KARIMY V. ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA CIVIL FILING

CIVIL COVER SHEET SJS 44 (Rev. 11/04) The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.) **DEFENDANTS** I. (a) PLAINTIFFS **SOHIL KARIMY** Associated General Contractors of America - San Diego Chapter, Inc., Apprenticeship & OB Thist Flight 3: 33 County of Residence of First Listed Defendant

ON OF PLANTIFF CASES ON LACTOR HIA

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE San Diego (b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) 108 CYED 0 2 974 L CAB Reich, Adell & Cvitan Attorney's (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Attorneys (If K 3556 Vilshire Blvd., Suite 2000, L.A., CA 90010 (213) 386-3860 III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES(Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only) (For Diversity Cases Only) and One Box for Defendant) DEF PTF DEF S. Government 3 Federal Question Incorporated or Principal Place \Box 4 **1** 4 (U.S. Government Not a Party) Citizen of This State **D** 1 01 of Business In This State **D** 5 □ 2 Incorporated and Principal Place O 2 S Government 4 Diversity Citizen of Another State of Business In Another State Defendant (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III) **1** 6 6 \square 3 3 Foreign Nation Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only) OTHER STATUTES FORFEITURE/PENALTY BANKRUPTCY 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 400 State Reapportionment PERSONAL INJURY PERSONAL INJURY 610 Agriculture ☐ 110 Insurance 620 Other Food & Drug ☐ 423 Withdrawal 410 Antitrust 362 Personal Injury -☐ 120 Marine 310 Airplane ō 28 USC 157 430 Banks and Banking 130 Miller Act 315 Airplane Product Med. Malpractice 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 450 Commerce 140 Negotiable Instrument Liability 365 Personal Injury -PROPERTY RIGHTS 460 Deportation Product Liability 630 Liquor Laws 150 Recovery of Overpayment 320 Assault, Libel & 470 Racketeer Influenced and 368 Asbestos Personal 640 R.R. & Truck 820 Copyrights & Enforcement of Judgment Slander Corrupt Organizations 330 Federal Employers' Injury Product 650 Airline Regs. 3 830 Patent 151 Medicare Act 480 Consumer Credit ☐ 840 Trademark 152 Recovery of Defaulted Liability Liability 660 Occupational 490 Cable/Sat TV Safety/Health Student Loans 340 Marine PERSONAL PROPERTY ☐ 690 Other 810 Selective Service (Excl. Veterans) 345 Marine Product 370 Other Fraud 850 Securities/Commodities/ SOCIAL SECURITY 371 Truth in Lending LABOR ☐ 153 Recovery of Overpayment Liability ☐ 861 HIA (1395ff) 350 Motor Vehicle 710 Fair Labor Standards Exchange of Veteran's Benefits 380 Other Personal 875 Customer Challenge Property Damage 862 Black Lung (923) 160 Stockholders' Suits 355 Motor Vehicle Act ■ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) 385 Property Damage 720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations 12 USC 3410 Product Liability □ 190 Other Contract 864 SSID Title XVI 890 Other Statutory Actions ☐ 360 Other Personal Product Liability 730 Labor/Mgmt.Reporting ■ 195 Contract Product Liability ☐ 865 RSI (405(g)) 891 Agricultural Acts & Disclosure Act ☐ 196 Franchise Injury FEDERAL TAX SUITS 892 Economic Stabilization Act CIVIL RIGHTS 740 Railway Labor Act REAL PROPERTY PRISONER PETITIONS 790 Other Labor Litigation 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff 893 Environmental Matters 210 Land Condemnation ☐ 510 Motions to Vacate 441 Voting 894 Energy Allocation Act or Defendant) 791 Empl. Ret. Inc. 220 Foreclosure 442 Employment Sentence 895 Freedom of Information Security Act 3 871 IRS-Third Party ☐ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment 443 Housing/ Habeas Corpus: 26 USC 7609 240 Torts to Land Accommodations 530 General 900Appeal of Fee Determination 245 Tort Product Liability 535 Death Penalty 444 Welfare 540 Mandamus & Other Under Equal Access 445 Amer. w/Disabilities 0 290 All Other Real Property to Justice 550 Civil Rights Employment 950 Constitutionality of 555 Prison Condition 446 Amer. w/Disabilities State Statutes Other 440 Other Civil Rights Appeal to District Judge from ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only) Transferred from ☐ 4 Reinstated or **I** 5 **D** 2 **3** Removed from Remanded from another district Multidistrict Magistrate Original Judgment Appellate Court Reopened (specify) Litigation Proceeding Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): 42 U.S.C. § 216(b) VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause Employment Discrimination / Fair Labor Standards Act VII. REQUESTED IN **DEMAND S** CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION > \$ 100,000.00 UNDER F.R.C.P. 23 JURY DEMAND: Yes O No **COMPLAINT:** VIII. RELATED CASE(S) (See instructions): DOCKET NUMBER IF ANY JUDGE DATE SIGNATURE OF AT 02/12/2008

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # 147669 AMOUNT \$350

2/14/108/14

APPLYING IFP

JUDGE

MAG. JUDGE